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CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY LIMITS FOR 
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS PURSUANT TO 
EXECUTIVE ORDERS 12,291 AND 12,498 
Leon Rodriguez* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Shortly after his inauguration in 1981, President Ronald Reagan 
presented his scheme for economic recovery before a joint session 
of Congress. 1 In that presentation, the President identified the costs 
federal regulations impose on government and industry as one of the 
major causes of the nation's economic woes. 2 He quoted estimates 
that regulatory costs would ultimately reach nearly 100 billion dol-
lars.3 As he told Congress, the Administration had already begun 
an assault on the volume of regulation. A day earlier, President 
Reagan issued Executive Order 12,291. 4 
Executive Order 12,291 provides for centralized oversight of 
agency rulemaking and requires that agencies issue regulations only 
where benefits exceed costs. 5 Executive Order 12,291 requires that 
each federal agency prepare a "Regulatory Impact Analysis" to be 
submitted, along with proposed or final rules, to the Director of the 
* Clinical Placement Director, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
The author would like to thank Thomas Hippler, Michael Perino and Daniel Kagan for their 
assistance in writing this Comment. 
1 Program for Economic Recovery: Address Before Joint Session of Congress, 17 WEEKLY 
COMPo PRES. Doc. 130 (Feb. 18, 1981). 
2Id. President Reagan also identified government spending and taxation as causes of 
inflation and economic stagnation. Id. at 131. The president asserted: "[W]e have no intention 
of dismantling the regulatory agencies, especially those necessary to protect the environment 
and assure the public health and safety. However, we must come to grips with inefficient and 
burdensome regulations, eliminate those we can and reform the others." Id. at 136. 
3Id. 
4 Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 
31. 
5 Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 4, § 2(a) and Preamble. 
505 
506 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 15:505 
Office of Management and Budget. 6 Under Executive Order 12,291, 
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), under 
the direction of the Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Reform, 
reviews and comments on both rule making proposals and final rules 
prior to pUblication. 7 
In 1985, shortly before his second term, the President issued 
Executive Order 12,498, adding a third clearance hurdle for federal 
regulations. 8 Executive Order 12,498 requires OMB review before 
any investigation of a rulemaking proposal. 9 The Order implements 
this scheme by requiring each agency to submit a "draft regulatory 
program" at the beginning of each year. 10 This program must discuss 
all the regulatory plans of the agency for the calendar year. 11 Under 
Executive Order 12,498, the Director of the Office of Management 
and Budget considers "the consistency of the draft regulatory pro-
gram with the Administration's policies and priorities and the draft 
regulatory programs submitted by other agencies. "12 Because this 
Order merely supplements the 12,291 scheme, this Comment pri-
marily uses the earlier Order as a model to examine the limits of the 
cost-benefit approach. 
The Administration's regulatory analysis scheme, as implemented 
in Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498, can impair the aggressive-
ness of federal regulations substantially. The power to do so stems 
from both the provisions of the Orders and their ultimate impact. 
The OMB submits comments to agencies at critical stages in the life 
of a regulation: 1) before investigation; 2) when a notice of proposed 
rule making is issued; and 3) before final promulgation of a rule. 13 
While the Orders require that the agencies incorporate OMB's com-
6Id. § 3(c)(2). 
7Id. In 1983, the Task Force was disbanded and its functions assumed by the OMB's Office 
of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). See Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of 
Management and Budget Supervision of Environmental Protection Agency Rulemaking 
Under Executive Order 12,291.,4 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 1,31-32 (1984). 
8 Exec. Order No. 12,498, 50 Fed.Reg. 1036 (1985). 
9 "There is hereby established a regulatory planning process by which the administration 
will develop and publish a Regulatory Program for each year. To implement this process, each 
Executive agency subject to Executive Order 12,291 shall submit to the director of the the 
Office of Management and Budget, each year starting in 1985, a statement of its regulatory 
policies' goals and objectives for the coming year and information concerning all significant 
regulatory actions under way or planned .... " Exec. Order No. 12,498, supra note 8, § 1. 
10 Id. 
11 I d. § 2(a). 
12 I d. § 3(a)(i). 
13 Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 4, § 3(a)(2); Exec. Order No. 12,498, supra note 8, 
§ 2(a). 
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ments into the rulemaking record, oral communications between the 
OMB and the agency are not included in the record. 14 OMB's rec-
ommendations are exempt from public comment. Powers such as 
these provide the OMB with a ready channel through which to inject 
a President's agenda into the regulatory process. 
Specifically, the Orders can intrude into the formulation of envi-
ronmental and public health regulations. To some extent, this is an 
overt goal of the Orders. Reagan Administration pronouncements 
evidence the conviction that excessively cautious risk assessments 
are one cause for overly burdensome compliance costs for industry. 15 
The way in which this motive informs OMB's approach to regulatory 
analysis becomes apparent in statements by Administration officials 
suggesting that OMB only truly looks at cost rather than benefit in 
deciding whether to unleash its power on an agency. 16 
The Order also threatens public health regulations in other ways. 
Public health and environmental regulations involve variables for 
which dollar values can only be assigned artificially.17 Some values, 
aesthetic and moral, simply do not submit to the type of empirical 
inquiry through which quantitative values might be assigned. In the 
case of health factors, quantification, while perhaps possible, pres-
ents a wide variety of practical and moral problems. To begin with, 
any assignment of values between human life and death is intuitively 
problematic, perhaps even morally offensive. But, more importantly, 
health regulations must choose not merely between life and death 
but also among comparative degrees of sickness and health. 18 
The review of cost-benefit analyses by persons who are not familiar 
with the technical complexity of a field means that regulatory deci-
sions will be treated differently. In assigning regulatory missions to 
agencies, Congress intended that these agencies apply their exper-
tise and an independent sense of mission to their work. 19 The intru-
14 Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of Management and Budget Supervision of 
Environmental Protection Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 4 VA. J. NAT. 
RESOURCES L. 1, 35 (1984). 
15 OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT, April 1, 1986-March 31, 1987, xi-xxxi (1986) [hereinafter REGULATORY PRO-
GRAMJ. 
16 Morrison, OMB Interference With Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a 
Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1065 (1986). 
17 Rodgers, Benefits, Costs, and Risks: Oversight of Health and Environmental Decision-
making, 4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 191, 194 (1980). 
18 See Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique, 5 REG. 31-36 (January, Feb-
ruary 1981). 
19 Olson, supra note 14, at 14, 18. 
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sion in the rulemaking process of agencies without the needed tech-
nical expertise threatens congressional intent. 2o This is a particular 
problem in cases where scientific evidence is sparse, and where 
statutes by necessity require risk judgments. 21 
The scholarly controversy on the Executive Orders has revolved 
around both their constitutionality and their desirability.22 Those 
supporting the Orders urge that the increase in burdens imposed by 
federal regulations demands coordination of rulemaking among Ex-
ecutive Branch agencies and assurance of the cost-effectiveness of 
regulations. 23 In arguing for the Orders' constitutionality, these writ-
ers cite to a line of Supreme Court decisions that validate the role 
of the president as an active manager of the executive branch. 24 
Supportive commentators assert that the "take Care" clause of the 
Constitution25 authorizes the president not only to oversee the ex-
ecution of isolated statutes, but also to insure efficient enforcement 
of the "mass of legislation. "26 Moreover, the observers assert that, 
on their face, the Orders run no risk of displacing congressional 
authority, because the Orders require specifically that their princi-
ples be carried out only "to the extent permitted by law. "27 Com-
mentary on the Orders focuses not only on their substantive impact 
but also on their necessity as a means to scrutinize the entire process 
of federal regulation, and to determine how resources will be allotted 
among the federal agencies. 28 
20 [d. 
21 See Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467,474-75 (D.C. Cir. 
1974). 
22 See REPORT FOR THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE: PRESIDENTIAL 
CONTROL OF AGENCY RULEMAKING, 97 Cong., 1st Sess., (Comm. Print. 1981) [hereinafter 
HOUSE REPORT] (this is the Congressional discussion of the validity of the Order). See 
generally Cost Benefit Analysis and Agency Decisionmaking: An Analysis of Executive Order 
12,291, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 1195 (l981)(Symposium). 
23 Shane, Presidential Regulatory Oversight and The Separation of Powers: The Constitu-
tionality of Executive Order 12,291,23 ARIZ. L. REV. 1230, 1245 (1981). 
24 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 80, ApPENDIX B (U.S. Dept. of Justice, MEMORANDUM, 
RE: PROPOSED EXECUTIVE ORDER entitled, FEDERAL REGULATION). See, e.g., Myers v. 
United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
25 U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3. 
26 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 81. 
27 See id. at 82. 
28 Demuth & Ginzberg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 
1075 (1985). 
Centralized review of proposed regulations under a cost-benefit standard, by an office 
that has no program responsibilities and is accountable only to the president, is an 
appropriate response to the failings of regulation. It encourages policy coordination, 
greater political accountability, and more balanced regulatory decisions. This is not 
to say that cost-benefit analysis is capable of abolishing narrow political influence or 
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Opponents of the Orders find them to violate constitutional prin-
ciples of separation of powers between the executive and legislative 
branches.29 They submit that the Orders interfere unlawfully with 
each agency's statutorily created mission. 30 These commentators as-
sert that the Orders' requirements are executive lawmaking of the 
type that the Supreme Court found unconstitutional in Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.31 In essence, these opponents believe 
that the Executive Orders allow the Office of Management and Bud-
get, as well as the President, to alter the substantive content of 
regulations, possibly in contradiction of statutory requirements or 
policies. 32 The opponents also charge that the orders permit the 
President's centralized and formal involvement in the rulemaking 
process, a role that Congress had not contemplated when enacting 
the Administrative Procedure Act. 33 Finally, they argue that the 
President is entitled to a formal opportunity to comment on regu-
lations where a similar opportunity is not accorded to other parties. 34 
Id. 
that the institutional interest of a central budget office will always provide a precise 
counterweight to the interests of program administrators. Our claim is far weaker, 
though still ample to justify the review process; rulemakers should be accountable to 
the president before issuing their rules and should be obliged to demonstrate the 
costs and benefits of their rules as thoroughly as circumstances permit. Assessments 
of social costs and benefits force regulators to confront problems of covert redistri-
bution and overzealous pursuit of agency goals, which experience has shown to be 
common in regulatory programs. OMB review subjects proposed rules to a "hard 
look" before they are issued and ensures that serious policy disagreements between 
a president's appointees (one with and the other without programatic responsibilities 
in the area in question) will be brought to his attention. 
29 See Rosenberg, Presidential Oversight of Agency Rulemaking: An Analysis of Consti-
tutional Issues That May Be Raised By Executive Order 12,291, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 1195 
(1981). 
30Id. 
31 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
32 See Rosenberg, supra note 29, at 1217. 
33 Id. at 1221-26. 
34 Id. at 1227. 
Id. 
The scheme of Executive Order 12,291 commands the intervention of the President's 
closest advisors at the earliest possible moment in the agency rulemaking process. 
The order also makes available to non-governmental and political interests a valuable 
and vulnerable early point of access to the agency decision-making process. This may 
be its implicit purpose. The process is therefore redolent with possibilities for secret, 
undisclosed and unreviewable communications and contacts by parties interested in 
influencing the substance of an agency's actions. The order provides no safeguards 
whatsoever to protect the integrity of the policymaking process or the interest of 
the public from such influences. On its face, then, the order deprives interested 
persons, now and in the future, of the most essential elements of fair treatment 
embodied in the notion of due process and is therefore unconstitutional. 
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While assuming the overall legality of the Orders, this Comment 
nevertheless argues that application of the Orders must be limited 
based on the constitutional boundaries of executive power and on 
the potential substantive impact of regulatory analysis. The Com-
ment traces the Supreme Court decisions that recognize the exis-
tence of a general managerial role for the President as well as 
decisions holding that there are certain capacities that are so essen-
tial to the execution of the presidential office, that they must be 
recognized as constitutional. This Comment explores a recent body 
of cases holding that executive orders cannot authorize the use of 
congressional means for the achievement of presidential policies. In 
determining whether statutes in the public health and environmental 
fields grant the authority to apply cost-benefit analysis to regula-
tions, this Comment emphasizes that cost-benefit analysis is not a 
value-free decision-making tool, but rather one destined to reflect 
the biases of the decision-maker. This Comment superimposes law 
relating to cost-benefit analysis on judicial tests limiting executive 
action. This combination suggests possible modes for limiting the 
application of Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498 within constitu-
tional and statutory boundaries. 
This Comment begins, however, by describing the history and 
nature of executive orders. Then, it considers previous executive 
branch schemes for regulatory reform. Finally, before analyzing the 
Orders, this Comment describes the Orders and their policy bases. 
II. EXECUTIVE ORDERS GENERALLY 
The term "executive order" has been used in different forms 
throughout American legal history, to describe actions that the ex-
ecutive branch has taken that are legislative in form and substance. 
James Hart included these activities within "the ordinance-making 
powers of the President of the United States."35 These activities fall 
into two general categories: "hortatory and declarative" or legisla-
tive. 36 The former category entails primarily ceremonial activities 
by the President such as the declaration of holidays. 37 This Comment 
35 See generally J. HART, THE ORDINANCE-MAKING POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES (1970). 
36 [d. at 47. 
37 [d. Such "ordinances" have included the annual Thanksgiving Proclamation or Woodrow 
Wilson's exhortations in support of the Boy Scout movement. [d. 
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will not address this category of activity. The latter, however, in-
volves the President in activities that an orthodox view of the Con-
stitution would find unconstitutional. 38 Nevertheless, since early in 
American history, the President has exercised powers that would 
fall into the legislative category. 39 
The President has exercised this residual legislative power in all 
aspects of policymaking, in both domestic and foreign matters. Pres-
ident Washington acquired, through congressional delegation, the 
authority to issue a directive laying an embargo during the Con-
gress's recess and granting him the authority to issue orders for the 
enforcement of that embargo. 4o President Lincoln's issuance of the 
Emancipation Proclamation extinguishing legalized slavery in the 
South, is an example of an executive order relating to domestic 
policy. 41 
These two examples also illustrate the two possible sources of 
authority for presidential acts: the Constitution and individual stat-
utes. 42 When the President acts strictly under the authority granted 
to him in the Constitution, his lawmaking power extends to the point 
where it conflicts with congressional intent in a specific field. 43 When 
Congress delegates to the President the power to issue executive 
orders, it vests its own legislative power in the President. To this 
extent, it can neither exceed its own constitutional grant of author-
ity, nor can it grant the President power in excess of his constitu-
tional authority. It is thus not within the power of Congress to grant 
the President legislative powers without including limits for the 
exercise of that power. 44 
38 See Youngstown Sheet & 'lUbe Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 586-89 (1952) (Black, J., 
plurality opinion). Justice Black wrote: "In the framework of our Constitution, the President's 
power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. 
The Constitution limits his function in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws 
he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad." Id. at 587. 
39 See HART, supra note 35, at 54-55. 
4°Id. at 54. 
41 Id. at 52. 
42Id. at 51. 
43 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 636--38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); see 
generally A. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY viii (1973). While Schlesinger's dis-
cussion focuses chiefly on the war-making power of the President, it suggests strongly that 
in practice, if not in law, the scope of the President's legislative powers has expanded consid-
erably in this century. I d. 
44 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 530 (1934). 
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III. PREVIOUS EXECUTIVE BRANCH REGULATORY REFORM 
SCHEMES 
Over the years, other presidential administrations have imple-
mented plans for reducing regulatory burdens. 45 For example, under 
the Nixon, and then the Ford, Administrations, the Office of Man-
agement and Budget created the "Quality of Life" review process. 46 
"Quality of Life" review enabled agencies and departments through-
out the executive branch to comment on proposed regulations. 47 The 
OMB Director's memorandum creating "Quality of Life" review in-
cluded the requirement that review apply to regulatory actions that 
would "impose costs, or negative benefits, to nonfederal sectors" and 
"that would increase the demand for federal funds for programs or 
agencies which are beyond the funding levels provided for in the 
most recent budget requests submitted to the Congress. "48 When 
comments demonstrated conflict between the rule proposed by the 
issuing agency and the observations of the reviewing agency or 
office, the Office of Management and Budget would convene a meet-
ing between the agency officials and other parties. 49 Office of Man-
agement and Budget officials would preside at these dispute reso-
lution meetings. OMB officials also possessed the authority to require 
additional meetings and additional review of rulemaking proposals. 50 
Although "Quality of Life" review addressed regulations concern-
ing environmental quality, consumer protection, and occupational 
safety, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) bore the brunt 
of "Quality of Life" review. 51 "Quality of Life" review revealed a 
"tendency for procedural techniques, such as interagency review, to 
pressure the agency toward substantive change, or to provide an 
opportunity for those opposed to statutory programs to delay their 
45 See generally HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 10-12 (summarizes earlier Executive 
Branch efforts to reform the regulatory process). 
46 See Office of Management and Budget Plays Critical Part in Environmental Policymak-




49 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 10. Often, the Commerce Department was a "hostile 
participant" in the review process. Apparently, the Department acted as a conduit for industry 
dissatisfaction with proposed rules. See also Bruff, Presidential Power and Administrative 
Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451, 464 (1979). 
50 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 10. 
51Id. One reason for this may have been "the considerable impact many EPA regulations 
have on the economy, specific sectors of the economy and other federal agencies." See OMB 
Plays Critical Part, supra note 46, at 693. 
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implementation. "52 "Quality of Life" review succeeded in changing 
EPA's regulations, but not through exhortation and compromise as 
the review scheme contemplated. 53 Rather, EPA would deliberately 
limit the coverage of regulations in order to avoid extensive review 
of its proposals. 54 EPA officials complained that such reviews created 
substantial delays in the promulgation of regulations. 55 To avoid 
these delays, the EPA would frequently submit regulations, that, in 
the words of one EPA official, were "more reserved, more scientif-
ically aggressive, less environmentally aggressive. "56 Thus, while 
"Quality of Life" could not directly compel specific rulemaking out-
comes, it had the power to alter the vigor with which the agency 
conducted its mission. 
The Ford Administration augmented this regulatory review re-
gime by issuing Executive Order 11,821, which required that federal 
agencies promulgating regulations prepare "Economic Impact State-
ments" and submit them to the Council on Wage and Price Stability 
(COWPS).57 The Order intended the statements to be a way of 
including inflationary impact among the factors considered in draft-
ing regulations. 58 As such, the agencies were to certify to the 
COWPS that they had considered inflationary impact in their pro-
mulgation process. 59 The COWPS was also authorized to determine 
which proposals were major proposals and to prescribe general pro-
cedures for the evaluation of regulations. 60 While the COWPS had 
the authority to review the statements, it could not require any 
changes in regulations. 61 
President Carter's Executive Order 12,044 repealed Executive 
Order 11,821. 62 Executive Order 12,044, promulgated in 1978, sought 
to increase public participation in the rulemaking process,63 as a 
means of insuring that regulations "achieve legislative goals effec-
52 Bruff, supra note 49, at 464. 




57 Exec. Order No. 11,821, 3A C.F.R. 203 (1974), reprinted in 12 U.S.C. § 1904 app. at 592-
93 (1976). For an extensive discussion of the Order see Note, The Inflation Impact Statement: 
An Assessment of the First Two Years, 26 AM. U.L. REV. 1138 (1977). 
58 Exec. Order No. 11,821, supra note 57, at § I. 
59Id. 
60 I d. § 2(a). 
61 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at II. 
62 Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1979). 
63 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 11; see also Exec. Order No. 12,044, supra note 62, 
§ 2(c). 
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tively and efficiently,"64 and do "not impose unnecessary burdens on 
the economy."65 Like previous and subsequent orders, 12,044 re-
quired the establishment of procedures for the identification of major 
rules and for analysis of regulations according to the Administra-
tion's policies. 66 In addition, the Order required the publication of a 
semiannual agenda of regulations in order to give the public adequate 
notice of significant regulations under development or review. 67 Also, 
the Order required that each agency chief review regulations prior 
to issuance. 68 
The most significant aspect of Executive Order 12,044, however, 
was a series of provisions oriented toward increasing public partic-
ipation in the rulemaking process. 69 To this end, the Order required 
that each agency give the public an "early and meaningful opportu-
nity to participate" in rulemaking. 70 Among provisions designed to 
achieve this result were: a requirement for the publication of advance 
notice of proposed rulemaking, a requirement for public hearings, a 
requirement that notice of publication be sent to those likely to be 
affected, and the direct notification of interested parties. 71 Addition-
ally, the section required a minimum of sixty days for public comment 
on regulations. 72 Like the Ford Order, Executive Order 12,044 gave 
no formal enforcement authority to any specific group,73 nor did it 
create a centralized structure to base clearance of regulatory pro-
posals upon agency compliance with Executive Order 12,044.74 
IV. EXECUTIVE ORDERS 12,291 AND 12,498: POLICIES, 
PROVISIONS, AND EFFECTS 
A. Constitutional and Policy Bases for Executive Order 12,291 
The stated goals and legal authority of Executive Order 12,291 do 
not appear inconsistent with the policies cited by the previous three 
64 Exec. Order No. 12,044, supra note 62, § 1. 
65 [d. 
66 [d. §§ 2(d)-(e). 
67 [d. § 2(a). 
68 [d. § 2(b). 
69 [d. § 2(c). This aspect of the Carter Order contrasts sharply with the Reagan Order which 
critics observe lessens the amount of public influence on rulemaking. See Rosenberg, supra 
note 29, at 1227-32. 
70 Exec. Order No. 12,044, supra note 62, § 2(a). 
71 [d. 
72 [d. 
73 [d.; see also Exec. Order No. 11,821, supra note 57. 
74 See Exec. Order No. 12,044, supra note 62; Exec. Order No. 11,821, supra note 57. 
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schemes. 75 The preamble locates the authority for Executive Order 
12,291 in the Constitution and laws of the United States. 76 It does 
not, however, elaborate this statement by citing either a specific 
constitutional provision or a statute that authorizes the President to 
implement a program such as that of Executive Order 12,291. 77 
Shortly before the issuance of Executive Order 12,291, however, 
the Department of Justice prepared a legal memorandum outlining 
the legal authority for Executive Order 12,291. 78 The memorandum 
locates the constitutional authority for the Executive Order in article 
II, section 3 of the Constitution, which authorizes the President to 
"take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,"79 and also in the 
interpretation of that power set forth in Myers v. United States80 
and in the dissent in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.81 In 
asserting the President's regulatory oversight power, the memoran-
dum states: 
It is well established that this provision authorizes the President 
as leader of the Executive Branch to 'supervise and guide' Ex-
ecutive officers in 'their construction of the statutes under which 
they act in order to secure the unitary and uniform execution of 
the laws which Article II of the Constitution evidently contem-
plated in vesting general Executive power in the President 
alone. 82 
The Justice Department memorandum construes this phrase to rec-
ognize a general coordinating function for the President,83 to the 
extent that the President is suited uniquely as the representative of 
the nation as a whole to promote the broad public interest in the 
execution of laws. 84 
The memorandum argues that Executive Order 12,291 is consis-
tent with most regulatory statutes. 85 According to the memorandum 
75 See OMB Plays Critical Role, supra note 29, at 693 (discussing Nixon's "Quality of Life" 
Review); Exec. Order No. 11,821, supra note 57 (Ford Order); Exec. Order No. 12,044, supra 
note 62 (Carter Order). 
76 Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 4, Preamble. 
77 [d. 
78 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 80. 
79 [d. at 80; U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3. 
8() 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
81 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 81; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 
U.S. 579, 687 (1952) (Vinson, C.J., dissenting). 
82 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 80 (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 
(1926». 
83 [d. at 80-81. 
84 [d. 
85 [d. at 81. 
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"inquiry into Congressional intent in enacting statutes delegating 
rule making authority will usually support the legality of presidential 
supervision of rulemaking by Executive Branch agencies. "86 From 
this hypothesis, the memorandum reasons that, on matters of both 
procedure and substance, the President presumptively possesses the 
power to supervise rulemaking, unless Congress seeks to delimit 
that power affirmatively.87 Moreover, the memorandum asserts that 
Myers leaves unclear the extent to which Congress "may insulate 
Executive branch agencies from supervision. "88 According to the 
opinion, "it would be anomalous to attribute to Congress an intention 
to immunize from presidential supervision, those who are, by force 
of art. II, subject to removal when their performance in exercising 
their statutory duties displeases the President. 1189 The opinion ap-
pears to suggest that the "general administrative control" estab-
lished by Myers should be construed broadly, to include not only the 
removal power, but also other unspecified supervisory powers. 
The memorandum asserts that the President, therefore, possesses 
the authority to consult with those agencies with statutory decision-
making power and require them to consider matters that the Pres-
ident deems relevant and appropriate. 90 The memorandum rests this 
authority on the notion that the President's power is not coterminous 
with the fact that the President has both constitutional and implied 
statutory authority to supervise agencies. 91 The President thus pos-
sesses constitutional authority to act beyond that which is accorded 
to him either implicitly in statutes or explicitly in the Constitution. 
As a result, the report urges that, except in those cases where cost-
benefit analysis is precluded by statute, the President's power of 
"supervision" allows the President to require agencies to apply cost-
benefit principles. 92 
Therefore, the tasks that the OMB would undertake would not 
displace an agency's statutory authority, as those tasks would be: 
86 Id. 
87Id. 
88 Id. In arguing for this supervisory power, the Humphrey's Court writes: "Congress is 
also aware of the comparative insulation given to the independent regulatory agencies when 
it has sought to minimize presidential interference. By contrast, the heads of non-independent 
agencies hold their positions at the pleasure of the President who may remove them from 
office for any reason." See Humphrey's Executor v. Rathbun, 295 U S. 602 (1935). 
89 Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. 602. 
90 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 81. 
91 I d. The Legal Opinion reasons that "supervision is more justified when it does not purport 
wholly to displace, but only to guide and limit, discretion which Congress has allocated to a 
particular subordinate official." 
92 Id. at 82. 
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"supplementation of factual data, the development and implemen-
tation of uniform systems of methodology, the identification of in-
correct statements of fact and the placement in the administrative 
record of a statement disapproving agency conclusions that do not 
appear to conform to principles expressed in the President's order."93 
The memorandum concludes that these functions do not displace any 
agency authority and are well within the President's authority. 94 
The preamble sets forth the Order's specific policy objectives 
which are "to reduce the burden of existing and future regulations, 
increase agency accountability for regulatory action, provide for 
presidential oversight of the regulatory process, and issue well-
reasoned regulations. "95 
These objectives introduce no new policies beyond those of the 
prior orders,96 and only hint at the breadth of the President's vision 
in issuing Executive Order 12,291. President Reagan's issuance of 
Executive Order 12,291, as well as the issuance of Executive Order 
12,498, reflects the Reagan Administration's view that regulatory 
burdens on industry and commerce undermine the efficiency of the 
market. 97 Thus, in unveiling his Program for Economic Recovery 
shortly after his election in 1981, President Reagan stated that his 
plan aimed at "reducing the growth in government spending and 
taxing, reforming and eliminating regulations which are unnecessary 
and unproductive or counterproductive. "98 According to the Presi-
dent, regulations impose three types of costs with potentially de-
structive effects on the economy as a whole. 99 First, regulations 
create enormous costs for the federal bureaucracy charged with 
administering and enforcing statutory programs. 100 Second, regula-
tions impose costs on businesses, non-profit organizations, and state 
and local governments. 101 Finally, regulations create hidden and in-
direct long-term effects on economic growth. 102 
93Id. 
94 Id. at 83. 
95Id. Preamble. 
96 See OMB Plays Critical Role, supra note 46, at 693; Exec. Order No. 11,821, supra note 
57; Exec. Order No. 12,044, supra note 62. 
97 See, e.g., United States Government Printing Office, Regulatory Reform, PUBLIC PAPERS 
OF THE PRESIDENTS: RONALD REAGAN 141-142 (Feb. 1, 1984). 
98 Program for Economic Recovery: Address Before a Joint Session of Congress, 17 WEEKLY 
COMPo PRES. Doc. 130 (Feb. 18, 1981). 
99 Program for Economic Recovery: White House Report, 17 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 
150-51 (Feb. 18, 1981). 
100 I d. at 151. 
101Id. 
102Id. The report does not identify these costs. However, § l(b)(2) of Executive Order 
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The Regulatory Program of the United States Government iden-
tified other aspects of the Reagan Administration's regulatory phi-
losophy that have come to inform the application of Executive Orders 
12,291 and 12,498. 103 In the Reagan Administration's view, certain 
tendencies of the regulatory process created the inefficiency that 
Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498 sought to combat.104 As such, 
the Program asserted that "oversight provides the means to prevent 
inefficient rules from being adopted by bureaucratic momentum 
alone, or as the result of pressure of special interest groups or 
businesses that want to confer benefits on a few at the expense of 
the many. "105 This statement seems to imply that in the Administra-
tion's philosophy, agencies should make public policy choices based 
upon aggregate impact, rather than on the impact on the intended 
beneficiaries of statutes. 
The Administration also seeks to narrow the protected population 
by revising standards of acceptable risk. 106 The Program contends 
that approaches to risk assessment tend to be excessively conser-
vative. 107 The report notes, for example, that the complexity of 
assessing cancer risk leads rulemakers to use upper-bound estimates 
rather than actual estimates of the risk of harm. 108 The Program also 
focuses its attention on studies of prolonged, intense exposure to 
harmful agents, and argues that regulations employing these studies 
exaggerate actual risk. 109 Such exaggerations result from the as-
sumption of lifetime exposure and most extreme environmental con-
ditions instead of average exposure and average environmental con-
ditions. 110 The Administration argues that environmental and health 
regulations based on this type of information "do not depict the 
national situation and will not maximize net benefits to society."111 
The report also identified a tendency to compound conservative 
assumptions and therefore regulate for risks that were yet more 
remote. 112 According to the Program, the typical risk-assessment 
12,291 suggests that they may include the reduction of investment, innovation, and the ability 
of American companies to compete with foreign companies. Executive Order No. 12,291, 
supra note 4, § l(b)(2). 
103 REGULATORY PROGRAM, supra note 15, at xi-xxxi. 
104 See Program for Economic Recovery, supra note 98, at 130. 
105 REGULATORY PROGRAM, supra note 15, at xi. 




llO [d. at xxiv-xxv. 
III [d. at xxv. 
ll2 [d. at xxv-xxvi. 
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includes ten separate sub-assessment stages at which analysts make 
independent determinations. 113 As scientists will tend to err on the 
side of caution, each estimate will be overly conservative. These 
assumptions combine to exaggerate the level of risk. 114 
Finally, the Regulatory Program reaffirms the federalist values of 
the Administration. While centralizing oversight, the Administration 
seeks to decentralize regulation away from federal control. 115 The 
Administration intends to minimize regulations that increase costs 
to states and that cover fields over which the Administration believes 
the states should retain legislative and regulatory authority.116 The 
Program notes that Administration efforts have already saved states 
annual costs of four to six billion dollars. 117 
B. Executive Order 12,291: Provisions 
The provisions of Executive Order 12,291 emphasize further the 
degree to which the Order implements the President's personal pol-
icies. While previous review techniques were oriented primarily 
toward reviewing regulations and reducing costs, the present Order 
also involves measuring benefits and comparing them to costs. 118 
Other schemes, no doubt, considered benefits. Because of the greater 
difficulty in quantifying benefit variables, their formal inclusion, in 
the 12,291 scheme increases the possibility that value judgments as 
to acceptable risks may displace congressional authority. 119 
The general requirements set forth in Section 2 demonstrate the 
extent of review under Executive Order 12,291. 120 Like earlier ex-
113Id. 
114 Id. 
115Id. at xiv. 
116 Id. 
117 I d. at xiv. 
118 Compare Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 4, § 2, with Exec. Order No. 12,044, supra 
note 62. 
119 See infra notes 308--345 and accompanying text. 
120 Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 4, § 2. This section entitled General Requirements 
provides: 
In promUlgating new regulations, reviewing existing regulations, and developing 
legislative proposals concerning regulations, all agencies, to the extent permitted by 
law, shall adhere to the following requirements: 
(a) Administrative decisions shall be based on adequate information concerning the 
need for and consequences of proposed government action; 
(b) Regulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to society 
for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society; 
(c) Regulatory objectives shall be chosen to maximize the net benefits to society; 
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ecutive branch regulatory reform schemes, requirements of 12,291 
apply to promulgation of new regulations, the review of existing 
regulations, and the development of legislative proposals concerning 
regulations. 121 The preamble to 12,291 requires that its provisions 
be applied "to the extent allowed by law."122 This phrase, along with 
other provisions of the Order, reinforces the Administration's inten-
tion that regulations remain within the authority delegated by the 
Administrative Procedure Act and enabling statutes. 123 Both this 
phrase and the Justice Department Legal Opinion, however, leave 
unclear the Administration's construction of the "extent permitted 
by law. "124 
Section 2 establishes five basic requirements that reflect the Or-
der's overall goal of reducing regulatory burdens. First, the Order 
requires that administrative "decisions be based on adequate infor-
mation concerning the need for and the consequences of proposed 
government action. "125 
The next requirement is perhaps the centerpiece of Executive 
Order 12,291, and is the requirement that distinguishes most fully 
this order from any previous regulatory coordination scheme.' This 
provision mandates that agencies not issue regulations where costs 
Id. 
(d) Among alternative approaches to any given regulatory objective, the alternative 
involving the least net cost to society shall be chosen; and 
(e) Agencies shall set regulatory priorities with the aim of maximizing the aggre-
gate net benefits to society, taking into account the condition of the particular indus-
tries affected by regulations, the condition of the national economy and other regu-




124 See also id. § 3(f)(3) ("nothing in this subsection shall be construed as displacing the 
agencies' responsibilities delegated by law"); see also id. § 4, which pr~vides: 
Before approving any final major rule, each agency shall: 
(a) Make a determination that the regulation is clearly within the authority dele-
gated by law and consistent with congressional intent and include in the Federal 
Register at the time of promulgation a memorandum of law supporting that deter-
mination. 
(b) Make a determination that the factual conclusions upon which the rule is based 
have substantial support in the agency record, viewed as a whole, with full attention 
to public comments in general and the comments of persons directly affected by the 
rule in particular. 
Administration statements suggest that statutory language, falling short of explicit preclu-
sion of cost-benefit analysis should be read to permit its application. See HOUSE REPORT, 
supra note 22, at 82. See also Recommendations of the Administrative Conference Regarding 
Administrative Practice and Procedure, 1 CFR 305.85-1 [Administrative Conference of the 
United States], 50 Fed. Reg. 28363, No. 134 (July 12, 1985). 
125 Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 4, § 2(a). 
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to society exceed benefits. 126 Consistent with this command is the 
OMB's authority to "prepare and promulgate uniform standards for 
the development of regulatory impact analyses (RIAs)."127 The Order 
thus authorizes the OMB to review not merely adherence to the cost-
benefit requirements, but to determine the methods agencies may 
use to conduct cost-benefit analysis. 128 
The third requirement of Section 2 of 12,291 is that agencies choose 
regulatory objectives that maximize net benefits to society.129 Con-
versely, the fourth general requirement is that in choosing among 
regulatory alternatives, the agency should choose those with the 
least net cost to society.130 While these two requirements appear 
contradictory on their face, it is important to note that the Order 
does not require the maximization of benefits and the minimization 
of costs. Rather, it requires that for any given regulatory objective 
the agency choose the least costly alternative. 
The final general requirement of Executive Order 12,291 states 
that regulations should maximize net benefits to society "taking into 
account the condition of the particular industry affected by the reg-
ulation, the condition of the national economy and other regulatory 
action contemplated for the future. "131 
Section 3 of the Order sets up the criteria for RIAs, which are to 
be included in the rulemaking record for every major rule. 132 Section 
l(b) designates as a "major rule" any regulation that is likely to 
result in: 
(1) An annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more; 
(2) A major increase in costs or prices for consumers, individ-
ual industries, Federal, State or local government agencies, or 
geographic regions, or 
(3) Significant adverse effects on competition, employment, 
investment, productivity, innovation or on the ability of United 
States-based enterpises to compete with foreign-based enter-
prises in domestic and export markets. 133 
126 Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 4, § 2(b); see generally Sagoff, At the Shrine afOur 
Lady of Fatima or Why Political Questions Are Not All Economic, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 1283 
(1981) (critiquing cost-benefit analysis under Exec. Order No. 12,291). 
127 Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 4, § 6(a)(2). 
128 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 82. 
129 Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 4, § 2(c). 
130Id. § 2(d). 
131Id. § 2(e). 
132Id. § 3(a). 
133Id. § 1(b). 
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Additionally, Section 3(b) authorizes the Office of Management 
and Budget to prescribe other criteria for designating a rule to be a 
major rule and for ordering a rule or a set of related rules to be 
treated as a major rule. 134 Section 3(c) requires that agencies submit 
RIAs for major rules along with a notice of proposed rulemaking or 
with a final rule. 135 Section 3(d)(1)-(5) describes information that 
agencies should include in the Regulatory Impact Analysis, in order 
that the OMB may assess the agency's compliance with the principles 
set forth in Section 2.136 Once an agency submits an RIA, the Direc-
tor may either clear its issuance by making no comment, or may 
notify the agency of his intention to comment. 137 Upon such notifi-
cation, the agencies must refrain from issuing final rules until the 
OMB has completed review, and the agency has responded to that 
review. The rule making record should include both the review and 
the response. 138 
Section 6 outlines the authority of the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget,139 again stating that his authority is lim-
ited "to the extent permitted by law. "140 The first two requirements 
134 Id. § 3(b). 
135Id. § 3(c). 
136Id. § 3(d) provides: 
To permit each proposed major rule to be analyzed in light of the requirements stated 
in section 2 of this Order, each preliminary and final Regulatory Impact Analysis 
shall contain the following information: 
(1) A description of the potential benefits of the rule including any beneficial effects 
that cannot be quantified in monetary terms, and the identification of those likely to 
receive the benefits; 
(2) A description of the potential costs of the rule, including any adverse effects 
that can not be quantified in monetary terms, and the identification of those likely to 
bear the costs; 
(3) A determination of the potential net benefits of the rule, including an evaluation 
of effects that cannot be quantified in monetary terms; 
(4) A description of alternative approaches that could substantially achieve the 
same regulatory goal at lower cost, together with an analysis of this potential benefit, 
and costs and a brief explanation of the legal reasons, why such alternatives, if 
proposed, could not be adopted; 
(5) Unless covered by the description required under paragraph (4) of this subsec-
tion, an explanation of any legal reasons why the rule cannot be based on the 
requirements set forth in Section 2 of this Order. 
Id. § 3(d)(1l-{5). See also id. § 2(al-{e). 
137Id. §§ 3(e)(2) and (0(1l-{2). 
138 Id. § 3(0(2). 
139Id. § 6. At the time that Executive Order 12,291 was issued, the Office of Management 
and Budget was subject to oversight by the Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief. In 
1984, the Task Force was disbanded, leaving the regulatory review function in the hands of 
the Office of Management and Budget. See Olson, supra note 14, at 31--32. 
140 Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 4, § 6(a). 
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in Section 6 grant the OMB authority to identify major rules,141 and 
to issue uniform standards for the identification of such rules. 142 
Section 6(a)(3) authorizes the OMB to require agencies to consider 
"any additional data from any appropriate source."143 Nevertheless, 
in all cases it raises a troublesome problem. Since RIAs are required 
for rulemaking proposals and for final rules, the requirement for 
additional information comes at stages in the rulemaking process 
where there is no public participation in the process. Hence, the 
information required, especially at the final rule, stage will not en-
counter scrutiny, opposition, or interpretation by anybody other than 
the agency itself. 
Finally, Section 6(a)(6) authorizes the OMB to develop procedures 
for estimating the annual costs and benefits of regulations for the 
purpose of compiling a regulatory budget.144 Such estimates should 
be based either "on aggregate and economic or industrial sector 
bases. "145 
C. Executive Order 12,498: Policies and Provisions 
The same policies that underlie Executive Order 12,291 underlie 
Executive Order 12,498. 146 Chiefly, Executive Order 12,498 aug-
ments the previous order by creating another level of OMB clear-
ance. 147 Executive Order 12,498 requires the OMB to compile a 
Regulatory Program that includes each agency's regulatory plans. 148 
Under Executive Order 12,498, each agency must submit an over-
view to the OMB which discusses the agency's policies, goals and 
objectives, as well as explaining how these are consistent with the 
Administration's regulatory policy.149 The overview should also con-
141 I d. § 6(a)(1). 
142Id. § 6(a)(2). 
143Id. § 6(a)(3). 
144Id. § 6(a)(6). 
145Id. 
146 Exec. Order No. 12,498, supra note 8, Preamble provides: 
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the 
United States of America, and in order to create a coordinated process for developing 
on an annual basis the Administration's Regulatory Program, establish Administra-
tion regulatory priorities, increase the accountability of agency heads for the regu-
latory actions of their agencies, provide for Presidential oversight of the regulatory 
process, reduce the burdens of existing and future regulations, minimize duplication 
and conflict of regulations, and enhance public and Congressional understanding of 
the Administration's regulatory objectives. 
147 See id. § 2(a). 
148Id. 
149Id. § 2(b). 
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tain information as to all regulatory action that the agency plans for 
the coming year. 150 In preparing the program, each agency must 
adhere to the principles of Executive Order 12,291. 151, 
The Director of the Office of Management and Budget has author-
ity to consider the draft provisions' consistency with the Adminis-
tration's policies and priorities,152 and to identify any further regu-
latory or deregulatory action that may be deemed to be consistent 
with the Administration's regulatory policies. 153 In the event of dis-
agreement, either the agency head or the Director may raise the 
issue before a cabinet councilor before the President. 154 
Essentially, Executive Order 12,498 allows the OMB to realize the 
goals of Executive Order 12,291 as early as possible in the regulatory 
process. 155 
D. Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498: Effects on the Regulatory 
Process 
Through these various provisions, the Orders aim to standardize 
regulatory analysis throughout the executive branch. 156 Executive 
Order 12,291 does not, however, authorize the Office of Management 
and Budget to compel a specific rulemaking outcome. 157 N everthe-
less, the Orders can affect the character of regulations significantly. 
It has adopted all the elements of the earlier orders, added new 
ones, and applied them broadly to all executive branch agencies. 
Executive Order 12,291 grants two significant powers to the Office 
of Management and Budget, that permit it to determine which rules 
will be subject to the Order, and which will not. The OMB may 
150 I d, § 2(a), 
151Id, § l(d); see Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 4, § 2. 
152 Exec. Order No. 12,498, supra note 8, § 3(a)(i). 
153 I d. § 3(a)(ii). 
154 Id. 
155 See Morrison, supra note 16, at 1063. 
156 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 21, at 80, 82. 
157 See id. § 3(0(1). The Order's only requirements at final rulemaking are that comments 
from the OMB be responded to and that these comments and responses to them be included 
in the rulemaking record. Nevertheless, the lessons of "Quality of Life" Review may apply to 
Executive Order 12,291. See supra notes 45-56 and accompanying text. All but one of the 
decisions involving Exec. Order No. 12,291 concerned delay in promulgation of regulations 
because of review under Exec. Order No. 12,291. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. 
Thomas, 627 F. Supp. 566, 571 (D.D.C. 1982) (Exec. Order No. 12,291 cannot be used to 
violate deadlines in the 1984 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); Natural Resources 
Defense Council v. Ruckelshaus, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20817 (D.D.C. 1984) 
(OMB review cannot take place where agency has bypassed congressional timetable for 
promulgation). 
1988] COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 525 
designate major rules158 and has the power to waive the Order's 
requirements. 159 Second, the Order grants the OMB the power to 
determine procedures for Regulatory Impact Analyses160 and for the 
estimation of costs and benefits.161 By standardizing analytical pro-
cedures, the Order may, in specific cases, preempt the particular 
equation of costs and benefits that the specific statute contem-
plates. 162 
By creating the presumption that cost-benefit analysis should be 
applied to all regulations, the Order goes further than any previous 
order.163 Unlike economic costs, which are either quantifiable, or at 
the very least, amenable to projection, benefits involve criteria that 
are more abstract, and more difficult to valuate. 164 Any quantification 
of values is necessarily arbitrary, relying more on intuition or indi-
vidual values rather than objective. measures. 165 For example, the 
Regulatory Program's argument that agencies should regulate to 
prevent typical risk rather than worst case risk166 is one way in 
which intuitive preferences will dictate which quantitative benefit 
(risk reduction) will be chosen. 
By imposing the review process on agencies, the Orders create a 
clearance procedure which can be used to manipulate rule making or 
at the very least to delay promulgation. 167 In cases where delay 
causes the rulemaking process to continue beyond a statutorily im-
posed effective date, courts have held that regulatory review must 
either be discontinued 168 or at the very least accelerated. 169 N ever-
158 Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 4, § 3(b). 
159Id. § 6(a)(4). 
16°Id. § 6(a)(2). 
161Id. § 6(a)(6). 
162 See EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64 (1980); American Textile Mfrs. 
v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981). 
163 Of course, cost-benefit analysis is not a new feature in the regulatory process. Rather, 
it is the first time this type of weighing is specifically required in regulatory review procedures. 
See Note, The Inflation Impact Statement: An Assessment of the First Two Years, 26 AM. 
U.L. REV. 1138, 1139 (1976). 
164 Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations For Environmental 
Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315 (1974). 
165Id. 
166 REGULATORY PROGRAM, supra note 15, at xxiii. 
167 Again, the experience of "Quality of Life" review is informative. In response to "Quality 
of Life" review, the EPA issued regulations which were "scientifically aggressive" as opposed 
to "environmentally aggressive" in order to avoid prolonged review. See OMB Plays Critical 
Part, supra note 46, at 693. 
Ifill See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Ruckelshaus, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. 
Inst.) 20817 (D.D.C. 1984). No courts have addressed situations where delay was argued to 
be unreasonable, rather than in excess of the statutory deadline. 
169 See supra note 157. 
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theless, the Orders discourage agencies from regulating aggres-
sively, by encouraging them to tailor regulation in such a way as to 
avoid lengthy review. 170 
V. LIMITING THE ApPLICATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDERS 12,291 
AND 12,498: SEPARATION OF POWERS MEETS COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS 
A. Constitutional Boundaries of Executive Action 
An examination of the relationship between Executive Orders 
12,291 and 12,498 and regulatory statutes must begin with an anal-
ysis of the allocation of legislative powers. Legislation, in this con-
text, means not only the product of the Congress, but any enact-
ments which may be, even in the broadest sense, the creation of a 
law. While the bulk of legislative powers is constitutionally granted 
to Congress, the Executive possesses certain residual legislative 
powers.171 The Constitution, with several exceptions, does not per-
mit the President to exercise that power spontaneously.172 Rather, 
that power must be delegated to him either by Congress or explicitly 
by the Constitution. 173 
With the growth of power of the executive branch, judicial analysis 
has begun to outline the boundaries of presidential power.174 The 
1890 case of In re Neagle first established the legal power of the 
President's quasi-legislative acts. 175 In Neagle, an officer of the 
United States Attorney General's Office, assigned as a bodyguard 
to Supreme Court Justice Stephen J. Field, killed David Terry be-
cause he believed Terry was about to attempt to kill Field. 176 Al-
170 Olson, supra note 14, at 50; see OMB Plays Critical Role, supra note 46, at 693. 
171 See U.S. CONST. art. I; see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,639 
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (suggesting a "zone of twilight" where both the executive and 
legislative branches may act). 
172 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 587 (Black, J., plurality opinion). 
173 See generally HART, supra note 35; see, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2[1] (making 
President commander in chief of the armed forces); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2[2] (granting the 
treaty-making power). 
174 In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1890). See also In re Debs, 158 U.S. 563 (1895). 
175 135 U. S. 1 (1890). 
176Id. at 44-46. The United States Attorney General had assigned David Neagle to protect 
Justice Field, after Terry had threatened his life. Upset over an unfavorable verdict that 
Field had returned against him, Terry had threatened Field on numerous occasions. In the 
incident leading to the killing, Justice Field was traveling to ride circuit in California along 
with Officer Neagle. While Justice Field was breakfasting on the train, Terry approached the 
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though he was acting to protect the judge, Neagle was taken into 
custody and charged with murder.177 A circuit court ordered the 
release of Neagle on a writ of habeas corpus, and the arresting 
sheriff appealed to the Supreme Court which upheld the writ.17S 
The court found that a federal statute authorized circuit courts to 
grant writs of habeas corpus to persons in custody for acts committed 
pursuant to the laws of the United States. 179 The court found further 
that "any obligation fairly and properly inferable from the Consti-
tution, or any duty of a United States officer is to be deemed a law" 
within the meaning of the statute. ISO The court held that the attorney 
general's order that Neagle protect Justice Field was such a law, 
even though it was not directly authorized by the legislature. lSI The 
court reasoned that as the attorney general is an officer whose power 
originates from his appointment by the President, he possesses au-
thority to act in the shoes of the President. 1s2 The Court ruled that 
article II, section 3 of the Constitution, the "take Care" clause, 
authorized the issuance of such a "law."lS3 Neagle teaches that the 
executive's obligation under the "take Care" clause, enables, indeed 
requires the President to exercise power that is legislative in form. 
Neagle also implicitly suggests that the "take Care" clause incor-
porates the liberal grant of managerial power to the President, in 
his capacity as chief officer of the Executive Branch. l84 With the 
growth of the federal bureaucracy, the Supreme Court has consid-
ered the notion that the Constitution grants the President manage-
rial authority as part of the "take Care" clause. 1s5 Decisions in the 
century following Neagle firmly established two themes in consti-
tutional analysis of presidential power. First, in order to exercise 
this managerial function, the President would have to perform func-
tions, which while pursuant to statutory or constitutional authority 
would be legislative in form.1s6 More generally, the President's man-
table holding his hand as if he were about to withdraw a weapon. Believing that Terry was 
about to draw a knife, Neagle withdrew his weapon, shooting and killing Terry. Id. at 44-53. 
177 I d. at 3-4, 53. 
178Id. 
179 Id. at 58. See Rev. Stat. U.S. § 753. 
180 In re Neagle, 135 U.S. at 58-59. 
181 I d. at 63. 
182Id. 
183 I d. at 63-64. 
184 Id. 
185 See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); Nixon v. United States, 418 U.S. 683 
(1973). 
186 See generally Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. at 52. 
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agerial authority included a number of specific and potent powers 
which were not specifically granted. 187 
Both of these themes underlie the Supreme Court's opinion in 
Myers v. United States. 188 The Supreme Court found that as a logical 
incident of his power to appoint federal officers, the President could 
remove them. 189 In that case, Myers had been appointed postmaster 
of the first class in Portland, Oregon. 190 In 1920, the Postmaster 
General demanded his resignation, which Myers refused to give. 
Soon after, the Postmaster General removed Myers, acting at the 
President's direction. 191 Myers' successors sued the Postmaster Gen-
eral, asserting that the President could not order his removal with-
out the Senate's consent. 192 
The Myers court found that the President's discretion in "deter-
mining the national public interest and in determining the acts to be 
taken," gave him the power to remove executive branch officers as 
he wished. 193 The Court found this power implicit in the "take Care" 
clause of article II. The Court wrote: 
The ordinary duties of officers prescribed by statute come under 
the general administrative control of the President by virtue of 
the general grant to him of the executive power, and he may 
properly supervise and guide their construction of the statutes 
under which they act in order to secure that unitary and uniform 
execution of the laws which Article 2 of the Constitution evi-
dently contemplated in vesting general executive power in the 
President .... The ability and judgment manifested by an official 
thus empowered, as well as his energy and stimulation of his 
subordinates, are subjects which the President must consider 
and supervise in his administrative control. Finding such officers 
to be negligent and inefficient, the President should have the 
power to remove them. 194 
While the Court's analysis identifies the existence of "the general 
administrative control of the President," it goes no further in stating 
what implicit authority, other than the removal power, might lie 
within the rubric of "general administrative control. "195 Nor does 
Myers give a clear statement defining the point at which the Exec-
187 See id. at 135. 
1881d. 
189 I d. at 118. 
190 I d. at 106. 
1911d. 
1921d. at 107. 
193 I d. at 134. 
194 I d. at 135. 
195 See id. 
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utive would surpass constitutional boundaries in exerclsmg such 
power.196 Nevertheless, Myers is directly relevant to Executive Or-
ders 12,291 and 12,498, because of their stated goal to improve the 
internal management of the executive branch,197 and because of the 
Orders' joint goal of avoiding duplicative regulations and of fostering 
inter-agency communication. 198 
Other cases have accorded other privileges to the executive branch 
not explicitly set forth in the Constitution. In Nixon v. United States, 
the Supreme Court recognized the existence of an executive privi-
lege to protect communications within the executive branch. 199 For 
the unanimous Court, Chief Justice Burger reasoned that certain 
presidential powers and privileges flow from the enumerated con-
stitutional powers and that consequently the protection of the con-
fidentiality of presidential communications had similar constitutional 
underpinnings. 20o The privilege for executive communications is an 
instance of another power that is essential to the orderly function of 
the executive branch and is thus accorded constitutional status. 
The case of Humphrey's Executor v. Rathbun201 concerned facts 
very similar to those in Myers v. United States. In Humphrey's 
Executor, however, President Roosevelt had ordered the removal 
of a member of the Federal Trade Commission, an agency not under 
the executive branch's direction. 202 The government asserted that 
the court should extend the removal power recognized in Myers to 
the situation in Humphrey's Executor. 203 The Humphrey's Executor 
court distinguished the situations, stating that the office of the Post-
master General was a unit of the executive branch, inherently sub-
ject to its power, whereas the nature of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion made it essential that it be free of executive control. 204 The 
decision also stated that, as between purely executive and purely 
independent agencies, it was unclear what would happen in cases 
where an agency was not clearly one or the other.205 This lack of 
196 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 8l. 
197 Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 4, Preamble; Exec. Order No. 12,498, supra note 
8, Preamble. 
198 Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 4, Preamble; Exec. Order No. 12,498, supra note 
8, Preamble. 
199 Nixon v. United States, 418 U.S. 683 (1973). 
200 [d. at 705-06. 
201 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
202 [d. at 618. 
203 [d. at 626. 
204 [d. at 627-28. 
205 [d. at 631-32 ("To the extent that between the decision in the Myers case, which sustains 
the unrestrictable power of the President to remove purely executive officers, and our present 
decision that such power does not extend to an office such as that here involved, there shall 
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clarity may mean that agencies with greater expertise should be 
treated as more independent from presidential control. 206 
While Myers and Nixon suggest an expansive reading of executive 
power, their holdings must co-exist with the limitations on presiden-
tial power inherent in the "take Care" clause. When the President 
acts, in his managerial capacity or otherwise, he must do so pursuant 
to constitutional or statutory authority. The source of most of the 
President's implied power in the domestic sphere207 is the mandate 
that the "President take Care that the laws be faithfully executed. "208 
Clearly implicit in that mandate is the requirement that the Presi-
dent's powers be used to achieve only Congressional ends. 209 
Of course, executive acts relying on the managerial authority of 
the President, must remain within the boundaries created by the 
constitutional separation of powers between the legislature and the 
executive. 210 Since Congress is the primary repository of legislative 
power, executive action must remain within the scope set by the 
legislature or it must involve the exercise of a constitutional function 
that Congress has not chosen to either limit or shape. 
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States211 discusses the 
degree of legislative authority Congress can delegate to the execu-
tive. In Schechter, section 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act 
authorized the President to approve "codes of fair competition."212 
The President could approve such codes for individual trades or 
industries, upon submission from an industry's representative as-
sociation. 213 The only restrictions Congress placed on the codes were 
that they place "no inequitable restrictions on membership" and that 
such codes not operate to create monopolies or to "oppress or elim-
inate small enterprises. "214 The President, acting under authority of 
remain a field of doubt, we leave such cases as may fall within it for future consideration and 
determination as they may arise."). 
206 See Olson, supra note 14, at 18 ("Congress has frequently expressed its intent that the 
Administrator apply his or her own expertise and that of the agency, in regulating technically 
sophisticated endeavours. "). 
207 It is generally recognized that the power of the President to invade the legislative 
prerogative is greater in matters of foreign policy than in domestic policy. See generally 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
208 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
209 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 583. 
210 [d. 
211 295 U. S. 495 (1935). 
212 [d. at 521-22. 
213 [d. at 522. 
214 [d. 
1988] COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 531 
the NIRA, issued by executive approval the Live Poultry Code in 
the N ew York City area. 215 
In holding that a conviction under the code should be overturned, 
the Supreme Court stated: "Congress cannot delegate legislative 
powers to the President to exercise an unfettered discretion to make 
whatever laws he thinks may be needed or advisable for the reha-
bilitation and expansion of trade or business or industry. "216 The 
Court expressed the fear that because the statute gave the Execu-
tive only the most limited instruction, the President had the power 
to make whatever laws he could include within the broad criteria 
set by the NIRA.217 Schechter establishes that Congress cannot 
grant unrestricted legislative power to the President. 218 By impli-
cation, it also establishes that the President cannot make laws that 
are not within statutory authority subject to judicial review. 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer considered the situation 
where Executive Orders contradict congressional enactments in the 
same field. 219 In Youngstown, a national dispute between steelwork-
ers and their employers brought the nation's steel industry close to 
a strike. 220 The threatened strike came at the height of the Korean 
war, jeopardizing the continued supply of war materiel to American 
troops.221 On this basis, President Truman issued an Executive Or-
der authorizing the seizure of the nation's steel mills and setting 
guidelines for their continued operation. 222 A group of steel manu-
facturers sued the government, claiming that the Order was an 
unconstitutional exercise of executive power. 
Despite finding the Order ultra vires, the Youngstown decision 
failed to clearly define the boundaries of presidential power. The 
opinion remains problematic in light of a plurality containing six 
separate concurrences. The first two opinions, those of Justices Black 
and Jackson, are cited most frequently and best articulate the debate 
on the scope of presidential power. 
215Id. at 523. The Schechter family operated whole poultry slaughterhouse markets in the 
New York City area. They were convicted of eighteen violations of the Live Poultry Code. 
The Schechters sought to have their conviction overturned, basing their case on the argument 
that the National Industrial Recovery Act was an unconstitutional overdelegation of power 
to the President. 
216Id. at 537-38. 
217Id. at 539. 
218Id. at 537. 
219 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
22°Id. at 582-83. 
221 I d. at 583. 
222 Id. 
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Justice Black's opinion for the Court adopts a clearer-but, per-
haps oversimplified and unrealistic-view of the separation of power 
between the executive and the legislature. 223 Black reasoned that 
"the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed 
refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. "224 Black construed the 
President's role literally, stating that the Constitution limits his 
function to recommending legislation to Congress and vetoing 
laws. 225 Black's analysis seems to accord no presidential power of 
interstitial lawmaking. Black's opinion, however, suggests that it 
was not the President's methods that were unconstitutional, but 
rather that Congress did not mandate the President's policy.226 Black 
reasoned that "the President's order does not direct that a Congres-
sional policy be executed in a manner prescribed by Congress-it 
directs that a presidential policy be executed in a manner prescribed 
by the President."227 Black's opinion does not signify, however, 
whether it would be constitutional for the President, in the absence 
of applicable congressional instructions, to carry out stated congres-
sional policies according to his own means. 
Justice Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown differs from Black's 
opinion in that it does not address presidential lawmaking authority 
as literally as Black's opinion. 228 He suggests the existence of a "zone 
of twilight" in which both the President and Congress may act. 229 In 
this zone, however, the President may exercise power only in the 
absence of inconsistent congressional action in the same field. 230 J ack-
son asserted that when the President issues "measures incompatible 
with the express or implied will of Congress, his power is at its 
lowest ebb."231 
Executive actions may have the "force and effect of law" and may 
be subject to the broad interpretation necessary to make the exec-
utive effective. 232 The inherent separation of powers between the 
executive and the legislature, however, necessarily limits executive 
action. 233 The President's supervisory rights are limited: 1) where 
223 See Bruff, supra note 49, at 472. 
224 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587. 
225 Id. at 587. 
226 I d. at 588. 
227Id. 
228 See id. at 592-634 (Jackson, J. concurring). 
229Id. at 637. 
230 See id. at 635-38. 
231Id. at 637. 
232 See In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 72 (1890); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926). 
233 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 538. 
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they involve the exercise of naked lawmaking;234 2) where they in-
volve independent agencies;235 and 3) where the President's action 
clearly contradicts the intent of Congress. 236 
As the Legal Opinion supporting Executive Order 12,291 sug-
gests, the Executive Order is an exercise of the "general adminis-
trative control" described in Myers v. United States. 237 Myers clearly 
holds that the "take Care" clause contemplated the "unitary and 
uniform execution of the laws."238 To the extent that the Order 
centralizes regulatory oversight and seeks to insert certain general 
regulatory principles into the administrative process, it is indeed 
aiming, at a "unitary and uniform execution of the laws."239 Myers 
may not simply be limited to the removal power. In holding that 
there is an "executive privilege" to "consultative privacy," Nixon 
similarly recognizes that there are other powers whose centrality to 
the executive function accords them constitutionality. 240 
Youngstown, however, holds that the Constitution limits the Pres-
ident's authority to engage in lawmaking. 241 Although the Youngs-
town plurality could not ultimately agree on the extent of the Pres-
ident's quasi-legislative power, certain extremes of presidential 
action do plainly lie outside the article II, section 3 grant of executive 
power.242 Clearly, where executive action contradicts either the 
terms or the intent of a statute, a court may invalidate that action. 243 
What Youngstown leaves unaddressed is the relationship between 
an executive order and a statute under which that order purports 
to act. 244 Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498 apply to the mass of 
regulatory legislation, making this inquiry essential in evaluating 
the relationship between application of Executive Order 12,291 to 
the rulemaking process and enabling statutes. Frequently, statutes, 
while not precluding cost-benefit analysis, may dictate the specific 
formula by which agencies will balance costs and benefits.245 As a 
234 Schechter, 295 U.S. at 846. 
235 Humphrey's Executor v. Rathbun, 295 U.S. 602, 625-26 (1935). 
236 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637-38. 
237 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 8l. 
238 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926). 
239 Id. 
240 Nixon v. United States, 418 U.S. 683 (1973). 
241 Youngstown, 343 U.S. 579. 
242 Id. at 581-92 (Black, J., plurality opinion); id. at 634-60 (Jackson, J., concurring); id. at 
660-67 (Clark, J., concurring); id. at 629-34 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 592-615 (Frank-
furter, J., concurring). 
243 Id. 
244 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 373 U.S. 579 (1952). 
245 See, e.g., American Textile Mfrs. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981). 
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result, the Orders' requirements that its provisions will not be ap-
plied in cases where they are precluded by enabling statutes may 
not always be an adequate safety valve against the Orders' 
transgression of statutory authority. Even where statutes do not 
preclude cost-benefit analysis, the equation of regulatory variables 
must reflect the priorities established by the statute, not those of 
the Administration. 246 
Enactments like Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498 lie precisely 
in the "zone of twilight" described in Justice Jackson's Youngstown 
concurrence. 247 In this zone, the President possesses implied power 
of the type suggested in the Myers dicta,248 but nevertheless is 
limited by congressional policies in enacting regulatory statutes. 249 
B. Defining the Relationship Between Executive Orders and 
Statutes: The "Nexus Test" 
The Supreme Court in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, found that in 
order for a regulation, issued pursuant to a statute and upon the 
direction of an Executive Order, to have the force and effect of law, 
"it is necessary to establish a nexus between the regulations and 
some delegation of the requisite legislative authority by Con-
gress."250 In Chrysler, President Jimmy Carter's Executive Order 
11,246 directed the Secretary of Labor to make certain disclosures 
regarding employment of women and minorities, pursuant to the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).251 Such disclosures, argued 
Chrysler, were barred by the Trade Secrets Act. That act prohibited 
government disclosure of secrets not "authorized by law."252 In seek-
ing to determine whether such disclosure was "authorized by law," 
the Court found that neither the policies in FOIA nor those in the 
several acts authorized such disclosure. 253 Without such authoriza-
tion, no nexus could exist. 
The "nexus" test was amplified in recent decisions in the Fourth 
Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit, suggesting that the 
President is not empowered to carry out "presidential policies by 
246 Youngstown, 373 U.S. at 579. 
247Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
248 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926). 
249 See AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
250 Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 304 (1979). 
251Id. 
252 Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 1905. 
25:1 Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. at 305. 
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presidential enactments. "254 Those cases have required the satisfac-
tion of the "sufficiently close nexus" test as the condition for validity 
of the Executive Orders. 255 In essence, the test states that the 
President may not use statutory authority to achieve an objective, 
merely because that objective reflects an important national prior-
ity.256 
In American Federation of Labor, Inc. v. Kahn, Judge Skelly 
Wright applied the "sufficiently close nexus" test in deciding whether 
an Executive Order by President Carter exceeded statutory author-
ity.257 In Kahn, President Carter issued Executive Order 12,092, 
directing the Council on Wage and Price Stability to set voluntary 
wage and price standards for the nation's economy.258 President 
Carter's order also directed that each executive department and 
agency require that all contractors certify that they are in compliance 
with Executive Order 12,092's wage and price guidelines. 259 The 
AFL-CIO challenged the Order, claiming that it exceeded the Pres-
ident's power. 260 
The Kahn court examined the question of whether authority for 
such an order was located in section 205(a) of the Federal Procure-
ment and Administrative Services Act (FPASA).261 Section 205(a) of 
the Act provided that the President could "prescribe such policies 
and directives not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act, as he 
shall deem necessary to effectuate the provisions of said Act. "262 
Moreover, section 201 of FPASA requires that policy and procure-
ment be conducted in a manner "advantageous to the Government 
in terms of economy, efficiency and service. "263 Among other 
grounds, the labor unions asserted that the President's order was 
not consistent with the policies of FP ASA, which addressed economy 
within the executive branch rather than in the nation as a whole. 264 
In response, the government argued that the reduction of aggregate 
inflation would reduce the costs confronted by government sectors. 265 
254 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Friedman, 639 F.2d 164, 171 (4th Cir. 1981). 
255 Id.; AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
256 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Friedman, 639 F.2d at 164. 
257 618 F.2d at 792. 
25b I d. at 785-86. 
259 I d. at 786. 
260 Id. 
261 I d. at 788. 
262 Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, 40 U.S.C. § 482(a) (1976). 
26:1Id. 
264 AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d at 786. 
265 I d. at 793. 
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The Kahn court found this rationale compelling. 266 Kahn held that 
the government had established a "sufficiently close nexus" between 
the Act's policies of "economy" and "efficiency" and the wage and 
price guidelines. 267 The court supported its finding of a nexus with 
the finding that Congress did indeed intend to inject broad social 
policies into the procurement process. 268 The court emphasized, how-
ever, that the decision did not "write a blank check for the president 
to fill at his will. "269 The President has to exercise the procurement 
power in a manner consistent with the structure and purpose of the 
statute that delegated that power. 270 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Liberty Mutual Insurance 
Co. v. Friedman271 amplified the "close nexus" test. The Friedman 
court applied the "close nexus" test to another Executive Order that 
also claimed section 205(a) of the Federal Procurement and Service 
Act as its authority.272 In Friedman, section 202 of Executive Order 
11,246 prohibited contractors and subcontractors with the federal 
government from discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin and required them to take affirmative action 
to ensure equal employment opportunity.273 Liberty Mutual was the 
insurance underwriter for many companies with government con-
tracts. 274 
Among the sources of authority cited for the Executive Order was 
the procurement power in section 205(a) of the Federal Property 
and Administrative Services Act, providing for an "economical and 
efficient system" of procurement of goods and services. 275 While the 
Act authorizes Executive Orders, it does not mention employment 
discrimination. 276 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
there did not exist the type of "close nexus" here that had existed 
in Kahn, because the statute had mentioned no affirmative action 
policy.277 The court refined the test stating that ther~ had to be 
findings of fact demonstrating that the ills addressed by the Exec-
266Id. 
267 I d. at 792. 
268 I d. at 790-91. 
269 I d. at 793. 
270 Id. 
271 639 F.2d 164 (4th Cir. 1981). 
272 Exec. Order No. 11,246, 42 U.S.C. § 4082(a) (note) (1976). 
273 639 F.2d at 165-66. 
274 Id. 
275 FPASA, 40 U.S.C. at § 205(a). 
276 639 F.2d at 165-66. 
277Id. at 170-71. 
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utive Order are those addressed by the statute whose authority is 
invoked. 278 The court emphasized that the procurement power under 
section 205(a) did not authorize the President to read any important 
national policy into the statute. 279 Where an executive order finds 
its authority in a statute, its terms must "lie within the contempla-
tion of that statute."280 If not, the order's failure to comport with 
statutory intent would violate separation of powers. 281 
The "close nexus" test suggests that executive action taken under 
the "take Care" clause cannot use congressionally delegated means 
simply to achieve presidential policy objectives. 282 The cases applying 
the "nexus test" involve executive policies similar to those involved 
in Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498. 283 In both situations, the 
President attempted to improve the economy and efficiency of the 
Executive branch. 284 It is notable that in order to achieve these 
goals, all the "nexus" courts required that the President's order be 
connected with the statute. 285 The cases do not, in contrast, suggest 
that such policies were derived from the President's managerial 
power. 286 
C. Judicial Validation of Congressional Restrictions on the Use of 
Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Thus, in directing agencies to apply cost-benefit analysis, accord-
ing to the methodologies suggested by the OMB and according to 
the Administration's regulatory principles, individual applications of 
the President's order may run afoul of policies underlying enabling 
statutes. 
278 I d. at 171 ("The connection between the cost of worker's compensation policies, for which 
employers purchase a single policy to cover employees working on both federal and nonfederal 
contracts without distinction between the two, and any increase in the cost of federal contracts 
that could be attributed to discrimination by these insurers is simply too attenuated to allow 





282 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Friedman, 639 F.2d at 171. 
283 See id. See also AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d at 792. 
284 See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Friedman, 639 F.2d at 171; AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d at 
792; Cf, Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 4, Preamble. 
285 Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 307 (1979); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Friedman, 
639 F.2d at 171; AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784. 
286 See Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 281; Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 639 F.2d at 164; AFL-CIO, 
618 F.2d at 784. 
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To the extent that the President may not use the Executive Order 
as a means of carrying out his own policies, application of cost-benefit 
analysis in accordance with OMB standards may lead to the use of 
cost-benefit formulas inconsistent with the policies or provisions of 
enabling statutes. 287 Cost-benefit analysis is not a value-free deci-
sionmaking tool, but rather one bound to reflect the biases of the 
analyst. 288 Some variables may resist quantification, while others can 
only be quantified arbitrarily.289 Thus, application of Executive Or-
ders 12,291 and 12,498 realistically threatens the degree to which 
regulations will remain consistent with congressional policies. Given 
the amorphous nature of cost-benefit techniques, regulatory analysis 
should seek foremost to follow the valuation of costs and benefits 
contemplated by Congress. Executive Order 12,291 is equipped to 
use rigid cost-benefit techniques and thus may lead to the application 
of analysis for which there is no "reasonably close nexus" between 
the application and the enabling statute. 290 
In examining cost-benefit analysis, this section limits itself to an 
analysis of cases concerned with environmental and public health 
issues. This focus reflects the "fragility" of the benefit variables that 
are incorporated into cost-benefit analysis,291 as well as the admin-
istrative orientation in the environmental field toward more "scien-
tifically aggressive" rather than "environmentally aggressive" reg-
ulation. 292 
Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498 function in a manner consid-
erably different from the executive orders in Chrysler and its prog-
eny. In those cases, executive orders operated under the provisions 
of specific congressional enactments.293 Here, the source of authority 
287 Shane, supra note 23, at 1247 (article supporting validity of order nevertheless states: 
"As to individual regulations, complex issues may arise concerning the extent to which an 
enabling statute permits the use of cost-benefit analysis. "). 
288 Rodgers, supra note 17, at 194-95. 
289Id. 
290 See Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 4, § 6(a)(6) (empowering OMB to establish cost-
benefit analysis procedures). 
291 Tribe, supra note 164, at 1318. 
292 See Olson, supra note 14, at 49-50 ("A more subtle and consequential internal develop-
ment induced by OMB review is a 'guessing game', in which EPA attempts to draft rules it 
believes will clear OMB."); Cf. OMB Plays Critical Role, supra note 46, at 693. (discussing 
EPA's inhibition from aggressive regulation under "Quality of Life" review). 
293 Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 307 (1979); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Friedman, 
639 F.2d 164, 170-71 (4th Cir. 1981); AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 785-86 (D.C. Cir. 
1979). 
1988] COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 539 
for the Orders is in the constitutionally-based managerial role. 294 The 
Orders, however, do not apply in a statutory vacuum. As Justice 
Jackson's Youngstown discussion about the "zone of twilight" sug-
gests, in a field where both Congress and the President are acting, 
congressional will must prevail. 295 
By holding that the President cannot use congressional means for 
the execution of his own policies, the "close nexus" cases suggest 
that analysis pursuant to the Executive Orders may not incorporate 
variables contemplated neither in the policies of the statute nor in 
the provisions of the statute. 296 These cases may further suggest 
that the comparative values assigned to variables used in the cost-
benefit process must comport with Congress's understanding of the 
relationship among those variables. 297 
Courts considering environmental agency applications of cost-ben-
efit or similar analyses have pursued reasoning similar to that in the 
"close nexus" cases. 298 They have found that agencies are not re-
quired to analyze regulations based on policies that are not found in 
the enabling statute. 299 American Textile Manufacturers v. Donovan 
(Cotton Dust)300 exemplifies courts' approach to administrative cost-
benefit balancing and statutory policies. In Donovan, the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration had issued standards con-
cerning the acceptable "cotton dust" concentration in textile facto-
ries. The relevant portion of OSHA's enabling act requires that: 
294 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 80. 
295 Youngstown Sheet & 'lUbe Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson J., concur-
ring). 
296 See AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d at 793. 
297 See id. See also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Friedman, 639 F.2d at 171. 
298 American Textile Mfrs. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 510-12 (1981); See also AFL-CIO v. 
Kahn, 618 F.2d at 792, 793; Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Friedman, 639 F.2d at 171. 
299 One notable peculiarity of these cases is that they involve industry plaintiffs seeking to 
compel either EPA or OSHA to consider economic factors or technological feasibility in the 
regulatory process. No cases have addressed the converse situation where plaintiffs are 
seeking either to exclude or diminish considerations of such factors. See infra note 300. 
300 American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981) ("Cotton Dust"). See Union 
Electric v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976) (§ 110(a)(2) of the Clean Air Act makes clear that economic 
feasibility need not be a factor in putting together air quality implementation programs); EPA 
v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1980) (in permitting variance from "Best 
Available Technology" standards under § 301(a) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 
the Court found that economic unfeasibility did not require variances). See Lead Industries 
v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1150 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied 449 U.S. 1042 (1980) (economic and 
technological feasibility are not factors for tempering an "adequate margin of safety" under 
§ 109 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409); Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of 
Management and Budget Supervision of Environmental Protection Agency Rulemaking 
Under Executive Order 12,291,4 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 1, 25-27 (1984). 
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The Secretary in promulgating standards dealing with harmful 
materials or harmful physical agents under this subsection shall 
set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent 
feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no 
employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional 
capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to the haz-
ard dealt with for the period of his working life. 301 
Textile manufacturers challenged the standards issued pursuant 
to this Act, claiming that they did not represent an accurate balanc-
ing of costs and benefits. 302 The Supreme Court rejected this con-
tention, stating that when "Congress had determined that an agency 
engage in cost-benefit analysis, it has clearly indicated such intent 
on the face of the statute. "303 Instead, the Court found that OSHA 
required the guarantee of health benefits to the extent feasible, 
rather than to the extent that was most cost-efficient. 304 
The Cotton Dust case makes clear that where legislation plainly 
outlines the balancing of costs and benefits, the agency can pursue 
no other formula. 305 Indeed, it leaves in question whether the agency 
can undertake cost-benefit analysis where it is not clearly authorized 
by the statute. 
Several questions remain unanswered after Cotton Dust. The case 
does not state the degree to which regulatory analysis must adhere 
to the terms set forth in the statute. 306 Nor does it state whether an 
agency can base its conclusions on cost-benefit analysis where the 
statute does not authorize it affirmatively.307 Nevertheless, under 
the "close nexus" test, there is considerable reason to adhere to a 
statute's equation of costs and benefits. Valuations of acceptable risk 
and of the costs necessary to prevent risks represent fundamental 
policies rather than value-free assessments. To the extent that the 
"close nexus" test prohibits application of policies other than those 
of the statute, the cost-benefit analysis must reflect the policies of 
the statute. 
301 American Textile, 452 U.S. at 508 (quoting Occupational Health and Safety Act, 29 
U.S.C. § 655(b)(3) (1982)). 
302 American Textile, 452 U.S. at 506. 
303 [d. at 510. 
304 [d. at 519-20. 
305 [d. 
306 The case does for example state that "substantive revision of regulatory policy" may be 
a function lying in Executive oversight. American Textile, 452 U.S. at 540 (citing Industrial 
Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 649 (1980)). 
307 See American Textile, 452 U.S. at 490. 
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VI. LIMITING ApPLICATION OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDERS 12,291 AND 12,498 
A. The Administration's Regulatory Agenda in Issuing the 
Executive Orders 
541 
Both Executive Orders grant the Office of Management and Bud-
get considerable power to determine the extent and nature of appli-
cation of cost-benefit analysis. 308 Executive Order 12,291 begins by 
stating that no regulation shall be promulgated "where costs to 
society exceed benefits. "309 The effect of this provision is to create 
the presumption that the OMB will use the cost-benefit approach to 
rulemaking to the exclusion of other less scientifically precise ap-
proaches. 310 
The Orders thus place considerable authority in the Director of 
the Office of Management and Budget, to determine how and when 
Executive Order 12,291 will apply.311 The Director is entitled to 
develop criteria for the designation of rules, or simply to declare 
that a given rule is a major rule. 312 Similarly, the Director has the 
power to waive the requirements of the order. 313 By authorizing the 
OMB to choose which regulations will be subject to 12,291 scrutiny 
308 See Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 4, § 6 (outlining OMB powers); Exec. Order No. 
12,498, supra note 8, § 3 (outlining OMB's power under 12,498). 
309 Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 4, § 2. 
310 Recommendation of the Administrative Conference of the United States Regarding 
Administrative Practice and Procedure, 50 Fed. Reg. 28363, 28364 No. 134 (July 12, 1985). 
§ 305.85-1 Legislative Preclusion of costlbenefit analysis (Recommendation No. 85-
1): 
Costlbenefit analysis may ordinarily be applied by an agency to a regulatory action, 
except when Congress has forbidden its use or has specified in the authorizing 
legislation, the precise regulatory outcome Congress desired. Any legislative direc-
tive short of complete specificity, however, can lead to disputes as to whether Con-
gress intended-or even contemplated-the application of cost-benefit analysis by the 
agency in the agency's adoption of legislative rules to carry out the program. Disputes 
about the agency's authority can undermine the regulatory program, and may at last 
be resolved, and then only temporarily, in a judicial rather than a legislative, forum. 
Protracted disputes over an agency's authority to apply cost-benefit analysis can be 
largely avoided by direct Congressional attention to the matter. 
[d. See also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 81 ("This is not to say that Congress never 
intends in a specific case to restrict presidential supervision of an Executive agency, but it 
should not be presumed to do so whenever it delegates rulemaking power directly to a 
subordinate Executive official rather than the President."). 
311 Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 4, § 6. 
312 Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 4, § 3(a). 
313 [d. § 6(d). 
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and which will not, the Order makes it possible to target regulations 
that are contrary to the Administration's policies. 
The Order gives the Office of Management and Budget the au-
thority to promulgate procedures for the drafting of RIAs and stan-
dards for assessing the social costs and benefits of regulation. 314 
Thus, the OMB possesses the power not only to determine when 
RIAs will be used, but also to dictate the methodology by which 
they will be used. 315 
Both in mandate and in everyday practice, the Orders endow the 
Office of Management and Budget with formidable powers of review 
over individual administrative agencies. The Orders require that 
RIAs be submitted to an OMB review groUp.316 Thus, the Orders 
permit OMB comment at points where public comment is unavaila-
ble. 317 Often OMB, upon submission of RIAs will lobby aggressively 
against regulations that are inconsistent with Reagan Administra-
tion policies. 318 The effect, as in Nixon's "Quality of Life" review is 
for agencies to voluntarily diminish the effectiveness of regulations. 
The Orders and the Administration's comments on them reflect 
the specific motives that the Administration wishes to introduce into 
rulemaking. 319 The Orders specifically state that one of their goals 
is to reduce regulatory burdens. 32o 
The Reagan Orders reflect an agenda of reducing the amount of 
regulation, particularly to the extent that it burdens business and 
industry. 321 Executive Order 12,291 itself contains some of these 
biases. For example, section 2(e) of the Order requires that agencies 
"shall set regulatory priorities with the aim of maximizing the ag-
gregate net benefits to society, taking into account the condition of 
the particular industries affected by regulation, the condition of the 
national economy, and other regulatory actions contemplated for the 
future. "322 This subsection thus suggests that agencies should place 
a particular regulatory focus on the affected industries. 
314Id. § 6(a)(2), 6(a)(6). 
315 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 82. 
316 Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 4, § 3(a)(2). 
317 See Rosenberg, supra note 29, at 1227-28. 
318 Olson, supra note 14, at 43-46. 
319 Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 4, Preamble, § 2; REGULATORY PROGRAM, supra 
note 15, at xi-xxxi. 
320 Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 4, Preamble. 
321 Program for Economic Recovery Address Before a Joint Session of Congress, 17 WEEKLY 
COMPo PRES. Doc. 130 (Feb. 18, 1981). 
322 Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 4, § 2(e). 
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Administration statements emphasize the Orders' deregulatory 
agenda. 323 For example, the current Administration is committed in 
its regulatory philosophy toward insuring that regulations are "con-
sistent with the constitutional principle of federalism. "324 One reason 
for this focus is that the states can save between six and eight billion 
dollars through this approach. 325 Another reason is the conviction 
that states are more competent to decide what is best for the peo-
ple.326 
The Regulatory Program's approach to risk-assessment reveals 
yet other biases. The drafters of the program argue that many 
assessments of risk focus only on upper-bound estimates of potential 
risk. 327 The Program argues, for example, that cancer risk estimates 
have been too conservative and that they presume lifetime expo-
sure. 328 According to the program, conservative assumptions of this 
sort will compound and have an extremely high likelihood of over-
stating actual risk. 329 Implicit in this argument are certain convic-
tions about what are acceptable risks. This may come undoubtedly 
to inform the way in which individual agencies make regulatory 
decisions. 
B. The Substantive Nature of Cost-Benefit Analysis 
In general, cost-benefit analysis is a very mutable tool involving 
numerous problems in valuation, and is therefore more suited to a 
public forum than to agency weighing. For example, those under-
taking to balance cost-benefit variables may not be able to quantify 
certain variables for purposes of compiling a regulatory record. 330 
One significant reason for this is that not all regulatory variables are 
amenable to quantification. 331 While some variables, such as lost 
323 REGULATORY PROGRAM, supra note 15, at xi-xxxi. 
3241d. at xiv. 
3251d. 
326 Id. 
327 I d. at xxiii. 
3281d. at xxiii, xv. 
329 Id. at xxv. 
330 The Order does, however, require that non-quantifiable variables be explained in the 
RIAs. Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 4, § 3(a)(l)-(3). 
331Rodgers, supra note 17, at 196 ("For many goods, market prices are simply unavailable 
and speculation soon takes over."). But see POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 357 (1986) 
("In areas involving safety and health, either cost-benefit analysis or benefit analyses requires 
monetizing risks to life and limb. But, as should by now be clear, this does not require putting 
a price tag on lives and limbs. All it requires is knowledge of the amounts of money that 
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industry profits are fit easily into a regulatory analysis, certain 
aesthetic and moral values are less easily quantified.332 Even where 
agencies can quantify values, it is difficult to identify the common 
denominator among the choices.333 One writer suggests that the only 
denominator would be a monetary one. 334 Even in the unlikely case 
that regulators could find a common denominator, the designation of 
numerical values would be highly arbitrary. 
Often benefits are not concrete, but rather reflective of legislative 
caution toward certain potentially harmful substances. Courts have 
relaxed standards of review in cases where the measurement of harm 
was on the "frontiers of scientific knowledge."335 Where Congress 
has chosen to protect against such unforeseen harm, assessment of 
benefit (reduced risk) cannot satisfactorily be measured against other 
variables. 336 
Assessment of benefits and costs based on market values-i.e. 
dollars-ignores the notion that people often make public decisions 
based upon entirely different considerations than they use for private 
decisions. 337 It would thus be ineffective to correlate public welfare 
values with market values. 
c. Factors in the Judicial Limitation of Executive Orders 12,291 
and 12,498 
Because cost-benefit analysis is a potent and possibly skewed tech-
nique, and because the Reagan Administration brings a very specific 
agenda to the application of cost-benefit analysis under Executive 
Orders 12,291 and 12,498, make necessary judicial scrutiny of the 
type suggested in the "close nexus" cases338 and in the cases where 
people demand to run small risks-risks of the same general level that pollution or other 
regulated hazards create. The amount of money demanded for assumip.g the risks is the benefit 
of eliminating the risk. "). 
332 See Kelman, supra note 18, at 31--36. 
333 [d. 
334 Rodgers, supra note 17, at 193-94. 
335 See Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474-75 (1974). 
336 Barnard, The Emerging Regulatory Dilemma in Management of Assessed Risk for 
Carcinogens, 363 ANN. N. Y. ACAD. SCI. 89, 90 (1981) (Stating that while government's general 
perception that there are a small number of carcinogens is based on dated information, there 
is growing evidence that there are a large number of chemicals that will "give a carcinogenic 
signal in some test system. "). 
337 See Kelman, supra note 18, at 35. 
338 See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979); American Federation of Labor v. 
Kahn, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Friedman, 639 F.2d 164 (4th 
Cir. 1981). 
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the courts have considered the application of cost-benefit analysis by 
regulatory agencies. 339 
These cases yield two important principles. First, an executive 
order cannot use congressional means for the realization of presi-
dential policies. 340 Second, cost-benefit weighing must be consistent 
with the equation of costs and benefits contemplated by Congress. 341 
By definition, cost-benefit analysis is the quantification of policy 
objectives. 342 Statutes typically have policy sections, which dictate 
the essential factors that must be considered in the regulatory pro-
cess. Individual provisions, such as that in Cotton Dust, also instruct 
agencies on how they are to assess the costs of regulations. 343 
Given that these policies are in fact stated, then cost-benefit anal-
ysis should not inject policies not contemplated by Congress. As the 
Myers managerial role suggests, one exception to this "nexus" re-
quirement might be the case where cost-benefit analysis incorporates 
variables that relate to the internal management of the executive 
branch. 344 Such a variable might, for example, be the cost of enforc-
ing a particular regulatory initiative. Alternatively, the executive 
branch may consider additional cost-benefit factors, where Congress 
has failed to set complete criteria for cost-benefit analysis. 345 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498 are potent enactments with 
considerable authority to alter regulations substantively. The Orders 
permit the OMB to decide which regulations will undergo regulatory 
analysis and to develop uniform methodologies for that analysis. 
Comment under the Executive Order 12,291 takes place at junctures 
in the rulemaking process where there is no opportunity for public 
comment. Moreover, as "Quality of Life" review demonstrated, 
agencies are often inhibited by regulatory review schemes from 
issuing aggressive regulations, fearful of delays in promulgation. 
339 See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979); AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. 
Cir. 1979); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Friedman, 639 F.2d 164 (4th Cir. 1981). 
340 American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981). 
341 See id. 
342 See Crandall, The Use a/Cost-Benefit Analysis in Regulatory Decisionmaking, 363 ANN. 
N. Y. ACAD. SCI. 99, 100-04 (1981). 
343 American Textile, 452 U.S. at 490. 
344 See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
345 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 539, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (recognizing that the President may act where Congress has chosen not to act). 
See also American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, AFL-CIO v. Carmen, 669 F.2d 815,821 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981). 
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The Reagan Administration's deregulatory agenda combined with 
the mutability of cost-benefit analysis compounds the power of Ex-
ecutive Orders 12,291 and 12,498. The Administration's statements 
make clear its objective to reduce the costs to the private sector and 
to state and local governments that overregulation has created. 
Similarly, the statements make clear that the Administraton is com-
mitted not to maximum protection against environmental and public 
health harms, but rather to risk-assessment based on typical expo-
sure. To the extent that the cost-benefit method is optimally effective 
only when involving variables that are both quantifiable and math-
ematically comparable, cost-benefit analysis in cases of health, moral 
and aesthetic benefit must necessarily be arbitrary. 
Of course, at some point the choice of acceptable risk must be 
made. Preferences expressed through the legislative process, how-
ever, are more likely to reflect public wishes than an arbitrary cost-
benefit formula. In other words, it is the legislature, not the Presi-
dent, who is empowered to design the cost-benefit equation. 
Accordingly, applying the "close nexus" test, cost-benefit analysis 
under Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498 must embody not the 
policies of the Administration, but rather those of the statute. In-
deed, statutes often suggest the criteria for such balancing. It is the 
Administration's responsibility to adhere to those criteria. 
